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Abstract
Isogeny-based cryptography using supersingular elliptic curves — most prominently, the
constructions of De Feo-Jao-Plut — is one of the few practical candidates for post-quantum
public key cryptography. Its formidable security claim is earned through the continual ex-
ploration of quantum algorithms for ‘isogeny problems’ and the assessment of the threat
they pose to supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. We survey the rich history of clas-
sical and quantum algorithms for isogeny problems, and close with an original result — a
quantum algorithm for the general supersingular isogeny problem, based on the discovery
of Delfs and Galbraith in 2013 — that has exponential-complexity in general and subexpo-
nential complexity in an important sub-case. As yet, this algorithm poses a limited threat
to the schemes of De Feo-Jao-Plut; however, it is an important algorithm to consider, for it
provides insight into the structure of supersingular curves and the isogenies between them,
and may lead to newer destructive quantum algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) dates back to 1985, when it was realized that it was a
promising candidate for public key cryptography based on the intractability of computing
discrete logarithms. Indeed, ECC based on discrete logarithms has performed well in prac-
tice and still, after decades of research into adversarial attacks, displays strong theoretical
resistance to classical attacks.
However, in 1994 Peter Shor [28] described a quantum algorithm for efficiently solving dis-
crete logarithms over finite groups. As yet, a large scale quantum computer that is able to
execute such an algorithm for a cryptographically-sized problem has not been built, but it
is clear that the landscape of cryptography will be forever changed with the first instance
of an adversary with such quantum computing power. This threat has induced the search
for classically realizable cryptography that is secure in a post-quantum world.
One answer comes from ECC itself. In 1997 it was noted by Couveignes [10] that ellip-
tic curves could be used in a fundamentally different way for cryptography than discrete
logarithms, by basing the cryptography on the difficulty of computing isogenies, which
are maps between elliptic curves. Starting from the observation that rational ‘horizontal’
isogenies can be described by a commutative group action, Couveignes and later, inde-
pendently, Stolbunov [32] built cryptographic primitives emulating classical ones such as
Diffie-Hellman and Elgamal, but with an essentially different underlying problem — that of
vectorization for the group action. These constructions were originally thought to display
quantum-resistant properties.
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However, since Shor’s algorithm, theoretical quantum computing research has shown that
many more computational problems are subject to improved quantum algorithms, endan-
gering their use as a basis for cryptography in the future. In particular, several black
box quantum algorithms tackle entire classes of problems and repeatedly demonstrate the
power of quantum computing over classical ones. One of these black box algorithms — the
abelian hidden shift problem — was shown by Childs, Jao, and Soukharev [8] to resolve
the Vectorization problem with a subexponential quantum algorithm.
However, in 2011 De Feo and Jao, in a work later extended with Plut [12], proposed schemes
based on supersingular elliptic curves, which are distinct in their complex multiplication
and isogeny behavior from ordinary curves. In particular, at first they do not display the
commutativity structure that enables straightforward group action cryptography, but in
the actual cryptographic context the authors overcome these ‘hurdles’ through specific pa-
rameter choices and minimal additional auxiliary input; the complexities of supersingular
algebraic structure then bolster the security. In particular, they do not succumb to such a
sweeping black box algorithm as hidden shift. For an exponentially sized security param-
eter p, the best classical algorithm so far is O(p1/4) and this is only improved to O(p1/6)
with a quantum algorithm.
We investigate the post-quantum security of supersingular cryptography, by considering a
more general ‘isogeny problem’ for supersingular curves. Resolving this problem acquaints
us with a major algorithmic paradigm for computing isogenies, which is to find a path in
an isogeny graph. The supersingular isogeny graph displays essentially different properties
from the ordinary one. However, in 2013, Delfs and Galbraith [13] found that a certain sub-
structure — one where consideration is restricted ‘entirely’ to the prime subfield Fp — does
display the structure of the ordinary isogeny graph. We describe a new quantum algorithm
—from joint work with Biasse and Jao — based on this discovery. The new algorithm runs
in exponential time O(p1/4) in general but Lp(1/2,
√
3/2) in the cases where the problem
is between curves in the prime subfield substructure. The algorithm has implications for
some supersingular cryptography, but not (yet) the schemes of De Feo-Jao-Plut, except
possibly to warn against a choice of basepoint over Fp as a cautionary measure. Neverthe-
less, it is an important algorithm to consider because it highlights the idiosyncrasies of the
supersingular graph, and may serve as a launchpad for future algorithms.
This thesis aims to be as self-contained as possible, and for this reason devotes two chapters
to mathematical and computational background for elliptic curves and isogenies. The next
two chapters are presented such that they first review the older discoveries for the ordinary
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case before discussing the supersingular case. We have decided on this presentation because
strategies for the supersingular case are frequently informed by ideas from the ordinary case,
most prominently the shared commutative square of De Feo-Jao-Plut for supersingular
curve cryptographic constructions and the result of Delfs and Galbraith for algorithms for
the supersingular isogeny problem.
3
Chapter 2
Background on Elliptic Curves
Notation 2.0.1. Throughout these first two chapters, K represents the ground field where
a curve is defined and F refers to an intermediate field K ⊆ F ⊆ K¯.
Background material in the following two chapters is collected from a variety of sources,
including standard sources such as [31, 30, 11, 26, 16, 38], but also various forms of lecture
notes and expositions, such as [35, 9].
2.1 A Computational Definition
Elliptic curves are objects from algebraic geometry. They have many equivalent definitions
in that area. A computational definition that maintains mathematical generality is the
following:
Definition 2.1.1. An elliptic curve E defined over the ground field K (denoted E/K) is
a smooth, projective plane cubic curve in P2(K¯)
E : a1X
3 + a2X
2Y + ...+ a10Z
3 = 0 : a1, ..., a10 ∈ K (2.1)
together with a distinguished K-rational point that is denoted by ∞.
Let us elaborate on this definition. A point on E is a projective coordinate P := [Px :
Py : Pz] ∈ P2(K¯) such that X = Px, Y = Py and Z = Pz satisfy the above equation (note
that satisfiability is independent of the particular homogenous coordinate representation
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for P ). The set of such coordinates constitute the points ‘collected’ over the algebraic
closure, denoted E(K¯). For any field F such that K ⊆ F ⊆ K¯, we can consider the
subset of F -rational points, denoted E(F ), which are the points P for which there is a
homogenous coordinate representation P := [Px, Py, Pz] such that Px, Py, Pz ∈ F . We are
often especially concerned with the points collected over the ground field, the K-rational
points E(K).
In cryptography, we are interested primarily in the case where K is a finite field Fq (and
call any such E/K an ‘elliptic curve over a finite field’). Note that this means we can
describe any point in E(K¯) exactly, instead of approximating the coordinates.
For theoretical purposes, we are also interested in the case that K is a subfield of C (and
call any such E/K an ‘elliptic curve over C’ or ‘complex elliptic curve’), especially when
K is a number field. Where K is not specified in a proposition, it means it applies to both
cases: subfield of the complex numbers or a finite field.
Mathematical languages such as SAGE can accept inputs of cubic curve equations with a
specified distinguished rational point, but immediately convert it to a standard form such
as a Weierstrass form to compute with it. In particular it is in these forms that smoothness
— also known as non-singularity or non-degeneracy — is quickly checked.
2.2 Weierstrass Equations
Elliptic curve equations can be transformed by change of variables formulas. Algebro-
geometrically these transformations are isomorphisms, and the essential properties of the
curve are maintained — the coordinate ring, function fields, etc. In fact, and crucially,
more is true — if ∞ is preserved, the groups (described in the next section) on the elliptic
curve are also isomorphic. This is a consequence of isogeny theory, as will be seen in the
next chapter.
We are especially concerned with the useful standard forms known as the Weierstrass
equation or form. Elliptic curves can always be transformed efficiently via a change of
variables into a long Weierstrass form [31, III.1]:
E : Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 = X3 + a2X
2Z + a4XZ
2 + a6Z
3 (2.2)
where ∞ = [0 : 1 : 0].
When K has characteristic not equal to 2, 3 (a situation we’ll never have to consider for
isogeny cryptography), they can be transformed into the highly compact short Weierstrass
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form [31, III.1]:
E : Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3 (2.3)
where ∞ = [0 : 1 : 0].
For an elliptic curve in Weierstrass form, besides the point∞, all other points on the curve
have coordinates [x : y : 1] and correspond to pairs (x, y) that satisfy an affine equation.
For example, for an elliptic curve in short Weierstrass form, these pairs (x, y) are the
solutions of
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b. (2.4)
Therefore, we can can always restrict our attention to this ‘affine model’ of the curve for
describing points, point computation, and maps between Weierstrass forms.
There are other major advantages of representing an elliptic curve with a Weierstrass form.
One of them is that though the forms are not unique for each isomorphism class of curves,
the isomorphisms between them are well classified. For example:
Proposition 2.2.1 ([31, III.1]). Elliptic curves E/K : y2 = x3 + ax+ b and E ′/K : y2 =
x3 + a′x + b′ are isomorphic over K¯ iff the coefficients are related by a ‘scaling’ constant
µ ∈ K¯∗ such that
a′ = µ2a
b′ = µ3b. (2.5)
If so, the isomorphism E → E ′ is given by (x, y) 7→ (µx, µ3/2y).
In the Weierstrass forms it is also easy to collect elementary data about the curve. One of
the most important is the discriminant ∆(E) that checks non-degeneracy.
Definition 2.2.2. For a curve E in short Weierstrass form (2.4)
∆(E) = −16(4a3 + 27b2). (2.6)
E is non-singular (and hence a valid elliptic curve) iff ∆(E) 6= 0.([31, III.1.4]).
Another important quantity is the j-invariant, which immediately gives the isomorphism
class of the curve.
Definition 2.2.3. For E given in short Weierstrass form (2.4)
j(E) = −1728(4a)3/∆. (2.7)
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Two curves E and E ′ are isomorphic (over K¯) iff j(E) = j(E) ([[31, III.1]]).
For curves given in long Weierstrass form, the formulas are a little more elaborate, but
not unwieldly from a computational perspective. Thus j and ∆ are always efficiently
computable.
Because it is easy to convert plane cubic equations into a Weierstrass form, a form that pre-
serves essential properties of the curve, we may assume our curves are given in these forms
to begin with. Note that for cryptography, we only use curves over a field of large charac-
teristic, so we can assume whenever we need to that curves are given in short Weierstrass
form (2.4).
2.3 Group Law
Elliptic Curves are used in cryptography because they have the additional structure of
an abelian variety ; their points constitute a commutative group whose group operation
(denoted +) is given by rational functions of their coordinates. In particular, for any
elliptic curve E/K, and F an algebraic extension of K, the points of E(F ) forms a group
under this operation.
Of the various derivations of this group law, we give the one that in the characteristic 0
case has a visualization as the so-called ‘chord-and-tangent’ rules. Consider two F -rational
points P and Q. The projective line between (tangent line in the case P = Q) them must
intersect at a third F -rational point, by Bezout’s Theorem [14, 5.3]. Call this point R. Now
consider the line between R and ∞. This line must again intersect in a third F -rational
point, call it S. Set P + Q := S. Of the group properties, it is easy to establish that
+ is commutative, that ∞ functions as the identity, and that points have inverses. The
hardest property to exhibit directly from this description is that + is associative, though
the property does hold.
We give explicit formulas for elliptic curves in short Weierstrass form (2.4).
Proposition 2.3.1 ([38, 2.2]). For a curve E given in short Weierstrass form, the described
group law above gives that for P = (x, y), its additive inverse is −P = (x,−y), and the
non-trivial 2-torsion points are the points P = (x, 0) on the curve. The remaining formulas
for addition of non-trivial affine points are the following. For P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2)
where Q 6= −P , P +Q = (x3, y3) where
x3 = −x1 − x2 + λ2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.8)
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where λ is the slope of the line through P and Q, i.e.
λ =

y2 − y1
x2 − x1 P 6= Q
3x21 + a
2y1
P = Q but 2P 6=∞.
(2.9)
2.4 Finite Field Elliptic Curve groups; m-torsion Sub-
groups; Supersingularity
When the ground field K is a number field, the famous Mordell-Weil Theorem says that the
group of K-rational points E(K) is finitely generated (and thus completely classifiable).
But now consider K = Fq a finite field, and F/K a finite extension (including possibly
F = K itself). Then E(F ) is finite, while E(K¯) is a torsion group of unbounded torsion
order.
Central to the theory is the characterization of the m-torsion subgroups E[m] ⊆ E(K¯).
Proposition 2.4.1 ([38, 3.1]). Let p = char(K) and consider m such that (m, p) = 1.
Then:
E[m] ∼= Z/mZ× Z/mZ. (2.10)
For the remaining case of m = pe, e ∈ Z+, two types of behaviour occur. Either
E[pe] = Z/peZ× Z/peZ, e = 1, 2, 3, ... (2.11)
in which case E is said to be ordinary, or
E[pe] =∞, e = 1, 2, 3, ... (2.12)
in which case E is said to be supersingular.
These facts are determined by analyzing certain isogenies called ‘multiplication maps’
described in the next chapter. Note that as m → ∞, E[m] is completely invisible over
E(F ). Nevertheless, using just elementary group theory, Proposition 2.4.1 can establish
the following:
Theorem 2.4.2 ([35, Corollary 7.4]). For F : K = Fq a finite extension,
E(F ) ∼= Z/mZ× Z/nZ (2.13)
8
for positive integers m,n such that m|n and p - m.
However, describing this isomorphism explicitly is in general infeasible, a fact which drives
elliptic curve cryptography. A ‘softer’ question is the cardinality of E(F ). Here the fol-
lowing theorem applies:
Theorem 2.4.3 ([16, 9.10.3]). Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve. Then
#E(Fq) = q + 1− tq (2.14)
where |tq| ≤ 2√q.
The value tq is known as the trace of the q-th Frobenius map piq, that we will also see
in the next chapter. An important algorithm of Schoof [27] uses isogeny theory and the
relationship between tq and cardinality to efficiently count #E(Fq).
The trace of Frobenius tells whether the curve is ordinary or supersingular.
Proposition 2.4.4 ([16, 9.11.2]). Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve. Then E is supersingular
iff char(Fq)|tq
Thus, Schoof’s algorithm also provides an efficient test of whether a curve is supersingular.
An important special case is when E is defined over a prime field.
Corollary 2.4.5. Let E/Fp be an elliptic curve. Then E is supersingular iff #E(Fp) =
p+ 1.
Proof. By Theorem 2.4.3, |tp| ≤ 2√p. But p | tp, so tp = 0.
9
Chapter 3
Background on Isogenies
3.1 Definition, Basic Properties and Important Ex-
amples
Definition 3.1.1. Let E1/K, E2/K be elliptic curves. An isogeny is a rational map of
elliptic curves φ : E1(K¯) → E2(K¯), with coefficients from K¯ that preserves the point at
infinity, i.e. such that φ(∞) =∞.
We can assume E1, and E2 are given as Weierstrass equations. In this case φ is fully
characterized by its action on the affine models for E1 and E2, and in particular can be
represented as:
φ(x, y) =
(
f1(x, y)
g1(x, y)
,
f2(x, y)
g2(x, y)
)
: f1, f2, g1, g2 ∈ K¯[x, y]. (3.1)
We allow the coefficients of φ to come from K¯; however, since there are only a finite number
of them, they all come from some finite extension of K. Let F be a finite dimensional
extension of K that contains all the coefficients. Then we say that the isogeny is defined
over F . When the defining field of an isogeny is known or unimportant, we may simply
write φ : E1 → E2.
As rational maps of smooth projective curves, non-trivial isogenies φ : E1 → E2 immedi-
ately inherit properties such as:
Lemma 3.1.2 ([14, Corollary 7.1.1]). φ is regular, i.e. it is defined on all of E1(K¯).
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Lemma 3.1.3 ([14, Problem 8.18]). φ is surjective on E2(K¯) (also known as geometrically
surjective).
A distinguishing property of isogenies is that they are group homomorphisms.
Proposition 3.1.4 ([31, III.4.8]).
φ(P +Q) = φ(P ) + φ(Q) ∀P,Q ∈ E1(K¯). (3.2)
Definition 3.1.5. The kernel of φ is defined by:
ker(φ) := {P | P ∈ E1(K¯) and P ∈ φ−1(∞)}, (3.3)
The kernel is exactly what appears to be the pole sets of the affine representation (3.1) of
φ above.
Lemma 3.1.6. For any isogeny φ : E1 → E2, ker(φ) is finite.
Proof. We prove it in the case φ is between Weierstrass forms. In this case consider any
affine representation (3.1). The kernel ker(φ) must be a subset of the intersection of the zero
sets of g1(x, y) and g2(x, y) on E1(K¯). This has to be finite since E1(K¯) is an irreducible
subset of A2(K¯).
Example 3.1.7. Isomorphisms that preserve ∞ (so-called ‘pointed isomorphisms’, in the
language of [16, 9.3]) are perhaps the simplest examples of isogenies. Consider the short
Weierstrass form elliptic curves E : y2 = x3+ax+b, a, b ∈ K and E(d) : y2 = x3+d2ax+d3b
for d ∈ K¯∗. Then E and Ed are isomorphic via the pointed isomorphism
φ : E → E(d)
φ(x, y) = (dx, d
3
2x). (3.4)
Note that although E1, E2 are both defined over K, if d is not a square in K¯, φ is not
defined over K; it is defined over K(
√
d). Thus E and E(d) are isomorphic over K¯ but not
over K; in this case E(d) is known as the quadratic twist of E over K.
Pointed isomorphisms lead to a natural notion of isomorphism of isogenies.
Definition 3.1.8. Isogenies φ1 : E → E1 and φ2 : E → E2 are isomorphic if there is a
pointed isomorphism µ : E1 → E2 such that φ2 = µ ◦ φ1.
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This definition suggests that the isogeny is essentially characterized by its kernel; we will
see how exactly in the next section on quotient isogenies.
We are sometimes interested in where an isomorphism between two isogenies is defined.
For example isogenies φ : E → E1 and φd : E → E(d)1 , for E(d)1 a quadratic twist of E1, are
not isomorphic over K.
Example 3.1.9. An infinite family of self-isogenies of E (called endomorphisms of E) is
furnished by “multiplication-by-m’ maps, defined by
[m] : E → E
P 7→ mP. (3.5)
The rational map corresponding to [m] has an affine representation as:
[m](x, y) :=
(
φm(x, y)
ψ2m(x, y)
,
Ωm(x, y)
ψm(x, y)
)
(3.6)
where ωm,Ωm, ψm are distinguished polynomials that can be computed recursively in m.
The polynomial family ψm are especially important: the roots of these division polynomials
on the locus of E are the m-torsion points E[m], the kernel of the map [m].
Example 3.1.10 (Frobenius morphism). These isogenies are central to the theory of el-
liptic curves defined over finite fields. Consider E/K an elliptic curve, where K = Fq and
char(K) = p, given in short Weierstrass form as y2 = x3 + Ax + B. It is easily checked
([31, III.4.6]) that E(p) : y2 = x3 + Apx+Bp is non-degenerate and that
pi(x, y) := (xp, yp) (3.7)
is a bijective isogeny E → E(p). It is known as the Frobenius morphism. Although an
inverse map is defined, it is not a rational map, and hence this map is not an isomorphism.
Now if the ground field K has size q = pn consider E(q) = E(p
n) as well as the n-th power
of the Frobenius map piq := pi
n. Because this map fixes K, E(q) = E and piq (also known
as piE) is an endomorphism known as the Frobenius endomorphism. We will gradually see
the importance of pi and piq.
The endomorphisms of a curve E can be pointwise added and composed, and in this way
form a ring End(E). It is easily shown that this ring is torsion free and that Z ⊆ End(E)
as multiplication maps. For elliptic curves defined over finite fields End(E) contains more
than the multiplication maps, but is still constrained.
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Proposition 3.1.11 ([35, Theorem 13.15]). Let E/K be an elliptic curve over a finite
field. Then E is ordinary iff End(E) is an order in an imaginary quadratic field Q(
√−d).
E is supersingular iff End(E) is an order in a imaginary quaternion algebra Q(α, β) with
α, β < 0.
The endomorphism ring of a curve E influences the picture of outgoing isogenies from the
curve. We will see how this is especially useful for ordinary curves in the last section of
this chapter.
It can be shown that every endomorphism satisfies a degree 2 monic equation over Z ([35,
Theorem 7.18]); in particular piq satisfies:
x2 − tqx+ q ∈ Z[x], (3.8)
where tq is the trace of Frobenius mentioned earlier.
3.2 Separability and Normality
Certain results and algorithms only hold for ‘separable’ and/or ‘normalized’ isogenies.
We thus view (in)separability and (ab)normality as complications to a simpler picture of
isogenies, that can nevertheless be easily accounted for and ‘corrected’.
An isogeny φ : E1 → E2 induces a monomorphism φ∗ : K¯(E2)→ K¯(E1) of function fields
defined by φ∗(f) = f ◦ φ. We are interested in the finite extension K¯(E1) : φ∗(K¯(E2)).
Definition 3.2.1. The degree of the isogeny φ : E1 → E2, denoted deg(φ), is the dimen-
sion:
[K¯(E1) : φ
∗(K¯(E2))].
The separable and inseparable degrees degi(φ) and degs(φ) are defined as the dimensions
of the corresponding extensions. Note that:
deg(φ) = degs(φ) degi(φ). (3.9)
The isogeny is considered inseparable whenever there is an inseparable component to the
finite extension, i.e. degi(φ) > 1. Otherwise it is separable.
Proposition 3.2.2 ([31, II.2.6]). Let φ : E1 → E2 be an isogeny. Then degs(φ) = # ker(φ).
In particular, when φ is a separable isogeny deg(φ) = # ker(φ).
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When char(K) = 0 all isogenies are separable. In the finite field case, the Frobenius map
is inseparable.
Lemma 3.2.3 ([31, II.2.11]). Consider E/Fq an elliptic curve. Then piq is purely insepa-
rable, i.e. degi(piq) = q and degs(piq) = 1.
In fact, all inseparable isogenies arise due to the presence of the Frobenius map.
Proposition 3.2.4 ([31, II.2.12]). Let E1, E2/Fq be elliptic curves. Then any inseparable
isogeny ψ : E1 → E2 factors as the composition:
ψ : ψsep ◦ pir (3.10)
where r is a positive integer and ψsep is a separable isogeny such that degs(ψ) = deg(ψ).
Thus, from any inseparable isogeny ψ, we can ‘get rid of’ its Frobenius precomposition pir
and ‘recover’ the separable map ψsep. We do this by just observing the consistent powers
of p that arise in the rational map ψ and removing them.
Besides separability, another ‘issue’ that pertains to isogenies is the question of normaliza-
tion. Consider again φ : E1/K → E2/K. Just as this rational map induces, functorially,
a map φ∗ : K¯(E2) → K¯(E1), it also induces one φ∗ : ΩE2 → ΩE1 , where ΩE is the
1-dimensional K¯(E)-vector space of rational differential forms. Of these forms, a distin-
guished one is the invariant differential :
ω =
dy
3x2 + a
=
dx
2y
Proposition 3.2.5 ([29, 2.20]). Let φ : E1/K → E2/K be an isogeny, and ω1, ω2 be the
respective invariant differentials. Then
φ∗(ω2) = cω1 (3.11)
For some c ∈ K¯(E1). If c = 1, φ is said to be normalized.
Proposition 3.2.6. Every isogeny φ : E1 → E2 can be postcomposed with a pointed
isomorphism τ such that the composition ψ = τ ◦ φ is normalized.
Proof. By first applying the appropriate change of variables, we can assume that E2 is
in short Weierstrass form. Let φ∗(ω2) = cω1. Post-composing with an isomorphism with
scaling factor µ (from 2.2.1) changes the invariant differential ω′2 =
1
µ
ω2 ([31, III,Table 1.2].
Therefore, choose µ = c and apply the corresponding isomorphism to E2.
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3.3 Isogeny Kernels and Velu’s Formula, Representa-
tion of Isogenies
Here we explore the question of whether and how an isogeny is characterized by its kernel.
In particular, from a finite subgroup C of E(K¯), is there a unique curve E/C and an isogeny
φC : E → E/C with kernel C up to isomorphism of curves as well as isogenies? Restricted
to the domain of separable isogenies, the answer is yes, and a positive construction of this
‘quotient isogeny’ is given by Velu’s formula [37]. We will detail the construction when E
is given in short Weierstrass form.
Let
E : y2 = f(x) = x3 + ax+ b
be an elliptic curve. Compute the following quantities.
v =
∑
P∈C−{0}
f ′(P )
w =
∑
P∈C−{0}
x(P )f ′(P ). (3.12)
Then E/C is given by:
E/C : y2 = x3 + Ax+B
where
A = a− 5v
B = b− 7w. (3.13)
The rational map φC : E → EC is given by:
φC(P ) := (x(P ) +
∑
Q 6=∞∈C
[x(P +Q)− x(Q)], y(P ) +
∑
Q6=∞∈C
[y(P +Q)− x(Q)]). (3.14)
Proposition 3.3.1 ([38, Theorem 12.16,12.17]). E/C is an elliptic curve (non-degenerate)
and φC is a normalized and separable isogeny E → E/C with kernel C.
Proposition 3.3.2 ([29, 3.5]). Suppose #C = `. Then the algebraic complexity of com-
puting the codomain E/C and evaluating the rational map φC on a point of E(K) is O(`)
operations in K¯ and O˜(`M(d)) operations in K, where d is the degree of the minimal ex-
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tension F/K that contains C, and M : N→ N a function such that multiplying polynomials
of degree n costs M(n) base field operations.
The universal property satisfied by φC is:
Theorem 3.3.3 ([35, Theorem 6.8]). Given a separable isogeny φ : E1 → E2 with kernel
C, there is a pointed isomorphism ϕ : E1/C → E2 such that φ = ϕ ◦ φC.
Therefore φC is the unique separable isogeny with kernel C up to isomorphism. Note that
for an inseparable isogeny φ : E1 → E2 with kernel C, the isogeny φC shares a universal
property with φsep.
Thus a kernel can represent an isogeny. But now the question arises: given C, where is the
rational map φC defined? It is not sufficient to consider the field containing the points C,
just as the multiplication by [m] map is defined over K even though most torsion subgroups
E[m] are invisible over E(K). Instead we consider the Galois action on the points.
Given E/K, the Galois group Gal(K¯ : K) acts on points of E by acting on their coordi-
nates: it is easy to see that if P is a point of E then so is σ(P ) for σ ∈ Gal(K¯ : K). Given
a subgroup C of E, we are interested in where points of C are taken under these Galois
actions.
Proposition 3.3.4 ([3, Theorem III.11]). Consider a subgroup C of E(K¯). Then C is said
to be F -Galois stable iff for all P ∈ C, and all σ ∈ Gal(K¯ : F ), it holds that σ(P ) ∈ C.
The quotient isogeny φC determined by Velu’s formula is defined over F if and only if C
is F -Galois stable.
When K = Fq, Gal(K¯ : K) is generated by the Frobenius map x 7→ xq. The Galois action
corresponding to this is exactly the Frobenius morphism piq.
Corollary 3.3.5. Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve and C ⊆ E(F¯q) be a finite subgroup. Then
the quotient isogeny φC determined by Velu’s formula is defined over Fqr if it is the case
that for all P ∈ C, pirq(P ) ∈ C.
3.4 Dual Isogenies, Isogeny Classes, Tate’s Theorem
For every isogeny φ : E1 → E2 there exists an isogeny φˆ : E2 → E1 known as the dual
isogeny.
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Proposition 3.4.1 ([31, III.6]). For every isogeny φ : E1 → E2 there exists a unique
isogeny φˆ : E2 → E1 of the same degree deg(φ) such that φ ◦ φˆ = [deg(φ)] and φˆ ◦ φ =
[deg(φ)].
Thus we can define a relation of ‘being isogenous’: E1 and E2 are F - isogenous if there is
an isogeny φ : E1 → E2 defined over F . Because of the existence of dual isogenies, this
relation is symmetric, and hence an equivalence relation, partitioning curves into isogeny
classes. Note that changing the field F potentially changes the classes. We can also
consider equivalence classes where F = K¯, which partitions curves into the most general
isogeny classes.
Tate’s Theorem says that for elliptic curves over finite fields, there is a simple necessary
and sufficient condition for two curves E,E ′ to be isogenous over a finite field Fq.
Theorem 3.4.2 ([36, Tate’s Theorem]). Let E,E ′/Fq be elliptic curves. Then E and E ′
are isogenous over Fq if and only if #E(Fq) = #E ′(Fq) .
Because of Schoof’s point counting algorithm, it can therefore be efficiently checked whether
two curves are isogenous over a particular field. But Tate’s theorem is non-constructive,
so it does not produce an isogeny where it exists. For a large degree isogeny, constructing
the isogeny is a much harder problem — a fact which drives isogeny-based cryptography.
3.5 Elliptic Curves over C I: An Identification with
Lattices and Complex Tori
We will appeal heavily to isogeny theory that is developed for complex elliptic curves and
then ‘reduced’ to elliptic curves over finite fields. Over C, elliptic curve theory simplifies
because a complex curve can be completely identified with a torus C/L, where L is a lattice
in C. Under this identification, isogeny theory in particular simplifies.
Definition 3.5.1. A lattice L := L〈ω1,ω2〉 is the additive subgroup of C generated by
linearly independent element generators ω1, ω2 ∈ C:
L = Zω1 + Zω2.
The numbers ω1, ω2 are known as periods of the lattice. We can assume without loss of
generality that arg(ω2) > arg(ω1).
17
ω1
ω2
C/L
0
Figure 3.1: A portion of the lattice L = L〈ω1,ω2〉 in the complex plane and the ‘fundamental
parallelogram’ (shaded) for the torus C/L
The quotient structure C/L, which is a torus, has an induced group law as well as an
induced topology from the canonical projection map p : C → C/L. From this torus we
define a special bijection ΦL to a complex elliptic curve EL ([26, Theorem 2.15]). Define
EL : y
2 = x3 + Ax+B
where A and B are the convergent quantities
A = 15
∑
ω∈L−{0}
1
ω4
B = 35
∑
ω∈L−{0}
1
ω6
. (3.15)
The bijection ΦL : C/L→ EL is given by:
ΦL(z) =
(
℘(z;L),
℘′(z;L)
2
)
(3.16)
where ℘(z;L) is the distinguished Weierstrass function, a meromorphic function defined
by
℘(z;L) =
1
z2
+
∑
ω∈L−0
( 1
(z − ω)2 −
1
ω2
)
.
The bijection ΦL, and in particular the Weierstrass ℘-function is extremely well motivated
and invokes a rich theory about complex elliptic curves. We just summarize the most
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relevant facts about the bijection ΦL for our purposes.
Proposition 3.5.2 ([35, Notes 15,16]). ΦL is a group isomorphism C/L→ EL(C) as well
as an isomorphism of complex manifolds.
The second property implies an isomorphism in the sense of algebraic geometry, so for
example ΦL induces an isomorphism between the function field C(EL) and the field of
elliptic functions on C for L, ξL.
The theorem that allows for a full identification of complex elliptic curves with complex
tori of the form C/L is the following.
Proposition 3.5.3 (Uniformization Theorem [35, Corollary 16.12]). For every complex
elliptic curve E in short Weierstrass form, there is a lattice L such that C/L is isomorphic
to E via ΦL.
Note that there is nothing special about the short Weierstrass form: indeed, we could
rewrite φL to establish a canonical bijection to valid plane cubic curves over C that define
an elliptic curve; we stick to short Weierstrass forms for simplicity.
As a consequence of these two theorems, complex elliptic curves can be fully identified
with complex tori. As a notational shorthand, let Φ refer to this overall correspondence
(we can consider Φ = {ΦL}).
As mentioned earlier, isogeny theory simplifies as a theory for these tori. Let E = EL1
and E = EL2 be two complex elliptic curves. Then an isogeny φ : EL1 → EL2 induces a
corresponding ‘isogeny’ φ∗ : C/L1 → C/L2 of tori:
C/L1
φ∗ //
ΦL1

C/L2
ΦL2

EL1
φ // EL2
(3.17)
i.e. φ∗ := Φ−1L2φΦL1 .
It turns out φ∗ is simply a ‘multiplication by λ’ for some fixed constant λ ∈ C.
Lemma 3.5.4 ([26, Theorem 2.38]). Consider φ˜ := p−1(φ∗) (i.e. the lift of φ∗). Then
φ˜(z) = λz for some λ ∈ C such that λL1 ⊆ L2. Thus:
φ∗(z mod L1) = λz mod L2. (3.18)
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Thus φ∗ can be simply be described as a ‘multiplication by λ’ map. Conversely, every
λ ∈ C such that λL1 ⊆ L2 induces a map λ : C/L1 → C/L2 that comes from an isogeny φ
in (3.17). This result justifies the following notion of isogenies defined strictly in terms of
tori:
Definition 3.5.5. For two lattices L,L′ ∈ C, consider a λ ∈ C such that λL ⊂ L′. Then
the induced homomorphism:
λ : C/L → C/L′
z mod L 7→ λz mod L′ (3.19)
is called an isogeny. It has kernel isomorphic to L′/λL.
Definition 3.5.6. An endomorphism of C/L is the induced map λ : C/L → C/L from a
λ ∈ C such that λL ⊆ L.
Note that under the correspondence (3.17), multiplication by m maps [m] correspond to
the dilation λ = m.
Definition 3.5.7. An isomorphism from C/L1 to C/L2 is the induced map λ : C/L1 →
C/L2 where λL1 = L2.
The complex tori C/L1 and C/L2 are isomorphic exactly when one lattice is a scalar
multiple of the other. We call this equivalence relation on the lattices homothety, and we
denote it by L1 ∼ L2.
Corollary 3.5.8. Φ establishes a bijective correspondence between isomorphism classes of
complex elliptic curves (given by j-invariant) and complex tori from lattices modulo the
relation of homothety.
Note the following construction of quotient isogenies for a complex tori. Consider a sub-
group C of C/L. Now consider C lifted to the complex plane (i.e. under p−1); this is a
lattice LC where L ⊆ LC . If we now set λC = 1 we have that λCL ⊆ LC and the induced
isogeny:
λC : C/L → C/LC
z mod L 7→ z mod LC (3.20)
has kernel exactly C. All isogenies can be described in this way up to homothety of the
lattices.
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3.6 Elliptic Curves over C II: Complex Multiplication
and Group Actions
From this point, we use a ‘complex elliptic curve’ interchangeably to denote a complex
Weierstrass equation E or its torus C/L.
Definition 3.6.1. A curve C/L has complex multiplication if it has an endomorphism
λ 6∈ Z.
That is, an elliptic curve has complex multiplication if it has endomorphisms ‘beyond’ mul-
tiplication by m maps. Complex elliptic curves with complex multiplication are strongly
characterized.
Proposition 3.6.2 ([26, Theorem 2.40]). If a curve C/L has complex multiplication, where
L = L〈ω1,ω2〉, then τ :=
ω2
ω1
is an imaginary quadratic number and End(E) is an order in
K = Q(τ).
We are particularly interested, for an order O in an imaginary quadratic field K, in the
set of isomorphism classes of complex elliptic curves with endomorphism ring O, denoted
EllO(C). These classes can be classified once it is recognized that O and its ideals are
themselves lattices. The following sets are especially relevant:
IO = {invertible ideals of O} (3.21)
C/IO := {C/a | a ∈ IO}. (3.22)
Lemma 3.6.3 ([35, Section 17.2 + Theorem 18.9]). For any E ∈ C/IO, End(E) = O.
Conversely every complex elliptic curve with endomorphism ring O is isomorphic (through
homothety in their lattices) to a member of C/IO.
Thus, C/IO constitutes a full set of representatives for EllO(C). However, these represen-
tatives are not in general distinct isomorphism classes of curves. In fact
C/a ∼= C/a′ ⇔ a ∼ a′ ⇔ [a] = [a′] in Cl(O).
Thus
Corollary 3.6.4. Cl(O) is bijective with EllO(C), by:
[a]→ C/a (3.23)
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where a is a representative for an ideal class such that a ∈ IO. In particular, EllO(C) is
finite and its size is h(O), the class number of the order.
However, there is more than just a bijection; Cl(O) induces, canonically, a free and tran-
sitive action on EllO(C). This action derives from a ‘parent’ action [35, Theorem 18.11]
which, importantly, has an interpretation with isogenies:
? : IO × C/IO → C/IO
a ? C/b = C/a−1b. (3.24)
Because b ⊆ a−1b, this action derives a quotient isogeny
φa : C/b→ C/a−1b
z mod b 7→ z mod a−1b. (3.25)
The kernel of this map is the set of points annihilated by a. In particular under the
isomorphism Φ, the isogeny is
φa : Eb → Ea−1b
with kernel the “a”-torsion Eb[a]. In particular the kernel has degree N(a).
This action can be considered modulo relations of isomorphism, both from the acting group
and the acting space, where it is well defined. The induced action is
∗ : Cl(O)× EllO(C)→ EllO(C)
[a] ∗ j(C/b) = j(C/a−1b).
This action is free and transitive [30, Proposition 1.2]. Thus EllO(C) is a principal ho-
mogenous space for Cl(O), or a Cl(O)-torsor. Note that there is a certain ambiguity in
interpreting ∗ with isogenies: if [a] = [a′], whre a, a′ ∈ IO, and N(a) 6= N(a′), they necessar-
ily derive non-isomorphic isogenies, though they have as codomain the same isomorphism
class of curves.
3.7 Reduction to Ordinary Curves over Finite Fields
The group action torsor reduces to the finite field setting, in the following sense.
The j invariants of EllO(C) all lie in a distinguished Galois extension of K, called the
Hilbert class field HO, with extension degree the class number h(O). Thus we may restrict
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ourselves to curves defined over HO and consider EllO(C) = EllO(HO). Because the curves
are defined over a number field, the following two theorems of Deuring, from Kohel’s thesis
[21], are extremely relevant.
Theorem 3.7.1. Let E˜/Q¯ be an elliptic curve with endomorphism ring End(E˜) = O,
where O is an order in an imaginary quadratic extension K of Q. Let P be a prime
ideal of Q, over a prime p, at which E¯ has nondegenerate reduction E. The curve E is
supersingular if and only if p has only one prime of K above it. If p splits in K, then let
m be the conductor of O, so that O = Z+mOK. Write m = prm0, where pr is the largest
power of p dividing m. Then the endomorphism ring of E is as follows.
1. End(E) = Z+m0OK is the order of K with conductor m0.
2. If (p,m) = 1 the map ϕ→ ϕ¯ is an isomorphism of End(E˜) onto End(E).
Theorem 3.7.2. Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field k of characteristic p and let
ϕ be an endomorphism of E. Then there exists an elliptic curve E˜ defined over a number
field H, an endomorphism ϕ˜ of E˜, and a prime P over p in H such that E is isomorphic
to the reduction of E˜ at P, and ϕ corresponds to a reduction of ϕ˜ under this isomorphism
Now consider a prime p that will give such an isomorphism of endomorphism rings between
the complex curves and reduced curves (necessarily ordinary), i.e.
1. p splits in the endomorphism algebra K.
2. The prime P ∈ HO over p induces a non-degenerate reduction of Weierstrass forms.
3. (p,m) = 1, where m is the conductor of the order O.
Now, for q = N(P) = pf , let EllO(Fq) be the isomorphism classes of ordinary curves
defined over Fq. Then the reduction map OHO → OHO/P extends to a reduction
g : EllO(HO)→ EllO(Fq) (3.26)
that is typically a bijection [6]. However, this bijection is non-canonical: for example when
p splits completely in HO we have h(O) reductions, under which a given complex curve
C/a can reduce to a curve in each one of the classes in EllO(Fq).
The reduction g preserves the group actions. Consider the set
EO(Fq) := {E/Fq|End(E) ∈ O}. (3.27)
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Then we have the reduction of the ‘parent’ action:
? : IO × EO(Fq) → EO(Fq)
a ? E = E/E[a] (3.28)
as well as, modulo isomorphisms, the reduced action known as the complex multiplication
operator :
∗ : Cl(O)× EllO(Fq)→ EllO(Fq)
[a] ∗ j(E) = j(E/E[a]) (3.29)
that makes EllO(Fq) a Cl(O)-torsor, a fact which originally motivated isogeny based cryp-
tography. Note that the action ? derives an isogeny: φa : E → E/E[a] of degree N(a).
Indeed, it constitutes a valid representation for this isogeny.
Lemma 3.7.3. The isogeny φa induced by an ideal a ∈ IO is Fq-rational.
Proof. For any P ∈ E[a], and for any a ∈ a, we have that a(piE(P )) = piE(a(P )) =∞ since
a, piE are both in O. Therefore piE(P ) ∈ E[a]. The claim follows from Corollary 3.3.5.
Now we consider the computational question of evaluating the action ?. Theoretically,
this doesn’t necessitate the evaluation of an isogeny — one could lift to a complex curve,
compute the action there (where we have canonical models C/L), and reduce it, without
deriving the isogeny. This method is usually considered totally infeasible for a number
of reasons, but especially that the class number h(O) is usually very large, making the
Hilbert class field HO infeasible to build and work with.
Instead, the best known method involves chaining prime degree isogenies. Indeed, consider
first the case where a decomposes:
a = pe11 . . . p
en
n (3.30)
into split or ramified prime ideals pi of small norm and with small exponents ei. φa
is computed as the composition of the prime degree isogenies φpi induced by the prime
ideals.
In the case a does not satisfy this smoothness property, the best algorithms compute an
isogeny induced by an ideal a′ ∈ [a] that is smooth. a′ and a differ by a principal ideal,
i.e. a = (α)a′, and there are efficient ways (in the norm of the ideal a) of computing this
principal ideal and evaluating at points the isogeny corresponding to it. If one is only
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interested in computing the isogeny star operator ∗, this last step can be skipped — in
other words, the approach is optimized for evaluating the star operator.
We close by discussing the basic step of this method, which is to evaluate the isogeny φl
induced by a split prime ideal l of small prime norm l. l is generated by (l, c+ dpiE), where
piE is the Frobenius endomorphism and c, d ∈ Z+.
A brute force strategy is to compute all l+1 cyclic subgroups of E[l]; we can then compute
the action of l on these subgroups. The one entirely annihilated by l is exactly the kernel
of φl. We can then use Velu’s formulas to evaluate φl as a rational map.
Lemma 3.7.3 suggests we may be able do better: we ought to be able to avoid exploring
isogenies that have no chance of being defined over Fq. We include here a discussion of the
so-called Schoof-Elkies-Atkins techniques that frequently narrows the ambiguity to just 2
curves and computes the kernels of the isogenies, for it gives a further sense of how complex
theory reduces in a useful way in the finite field setting.
3.7.1 Schoof-Elkies-Atkins (SEA) Technique
Algorithm 1 Compute φl for a split prime ideal l
Input: E/Fq in Weierstrass form, l = (l, c + dpiE) a split prime ideal in IO, where O ∼=
End(E) an order in K, and l - [OK : Z[piE]]
Output: An evaluation of φl : E → E ′
1: Construct the modular polynomial Φl(X, Y ) ∈ Fq and find the two roots j1 and j2 of
Φl(j(E), Y ) over Fq
2: For each root, use the formulas (3.31) to find target curves E1/Fq and E2/Fq and a
prime degree isogeny algorithm from Proposition 3.7.6 to find points P1 and P2 such
that 〈P1〉 and 〈P2〉 are the kernels of the isogenies to E1 and E2 respectively.
3: Find which point satisfies [c] + [d]piq(Pi) =∞; this point Pi is the kernel of φl
4: Use Velu’s formula for 〈Pi〉 to evaluate φl
Definition 3.7.4. The modular polynomial of degree N is a symmetric polynomial ΦN(X, Y )
of degree 2N +1 in Z[X, Y ] that parameterizes pairs of j invariants over C that are related
by a cyclic N -isogeny (for any representative curves).
Consequently, given a curve E and a prime l, the roots of Φl(j(E), X) give the j-invariants
of complex curves l-isogenous to E. For each root j′, we can construct a curve E ′ as well
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as a normalized l- isogeny E → E ′ via the following ‘Atkins-Elkies’ formulas [27, 6], which
has an elegant derivation in the complex setting.
s = −18
l
b
a
ΦX(j(E), j
′)
ΦY (j(E), j′)
j(E)
a′ = − 1
48
s2
h(h− 1728)
b′ = − 1
864
s3
h2(h− 1728) (3.31)
Lemma 3.7.5 ([27, 7]). The curve E ′ : y2 = x3 + a′x + b′, where the coefficients are
from (3.31), has j-invariant j′ and establishes the existence of a normalized and separable
l-isogeny φ : E → E ′.
Knowledge of E,E ′ and l establishes a situation converse to the construction using Velu’s
formula: whereas Velu’s formula finds a quotient isogeny and a codomain curve from a
kernel, we seek to find the kernel and the corresponding isogeny from knowledge of the
codomain curve and the isogeny’s degree. For a prime degree l, and where the curves are
in short Weierstrass form, there are such isogeny algorithms and they have their derivation
in the complex setting.
Proposition 3.7.6 ([4]). Let E,E ′ be two curves of characteristic 0 in short Weierstrass
form, such that there exists a normalized isogeny φ : E → E ′ of known prime degree l.
Then one can compute the isogeny φ in O(M(l) log l) operations.
The form of the output of the algorithm is typically a kernel polynomial — a univariate
polynomial whose roots are exactly the x-coordinates of the points in ker(φ) (this is suffi-
cient for E in short Weierstrass form for each root is the x-coordinate of a pair of additive
inverses of E, both of which are in ker(φ)). Note that if we take any root x of fE→E′ and
find a corresponding point P = (x, y) on E, then 〈P 〉 = ker(φ).
Warning 3.7.7. Although these isogeny algorithms extend mutatis mutandis to cyclic N -
isogenies [4], they do not hold for non-cyclic N -isogenies. Therefore, they cannot be naively
applied to an isogeny problem underlying isogeny based cryptography.
The reason these facts are helpful is that all these formulas, as well as their properties,
hold mod P as well; and in this case inspection reveals that it amounts to reducing mod
q (note that we must now take l 6= char(Fq) to ensure separability). In particular, for
E/Fq, we only need consider roots of Φl(j(E), Y ) that lie over Fq; only these roots produce
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curves that have a chance of defining an Fq-rational isogeny. As long as l - [Ok : Z[piE]],
Φl(j(E), Y ) will have either 0, 1, or 2 roots [34]. When l is a split prime over l it will be
exactly 2 (when l is ramified there is no ambiguity). Both of these roots are codomains
of Fq rational l-isogenies, and thus we only have an ambiguity of at most 2 as opposed to
l + 1 in determining φl. We use the formulas (3.31) to find their kernel polynomials and
test it under the action of l.
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Chapter 4
Isogeny-based Cryptography
4.1 Cryptography based on Ordinary Curves
Isogeny based cryptography was originally based on ordinary curves, and in particular the
Cl(O)-torsor EllO(Fq). It was discovered first by Couveignes [10] in an unpublished article
in 1997 and then later independently by Stolbunov [32] in 2008. Both motivate it from the
fact that a set with group action that satisfies certain assumptions of ‘efficient’ and ‘hard’
problems in the homogenous space generalizes the classical dichotomy of exponentiation
vs. discrete logarithm in finite fields, and consequently leads to cryptographic primitives
emulating classical ones such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and Elgamal encryption,
with analogus security reductions.
4.1.1 Hard Homogenous Spaces and Some Public-key Protocols
Couveignes gave a succinct descripton of when and how a G-torsor X, for a commutative
group G, can lead to public key cryptography.
Definition 4.1.1. A G-torsor X, for a commutative group G, based on the group action
∗ : G×X → X
is a hard homogenous space (HHS) if it meets the following general requirements. The
following computations should be computationally efficient:
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1. (Group computation) Compute for any g, g−1, or for any two elements g1, g2, the
product g1g2.
2. (Random element) Find a random element g ∈ G.
3. (Membership) Test whether a given element x is contained in X.
4. (Action) Given g ∈ G and x ∈ X, compute g ∗ x.
The following problems should be computationally hard:
1. (Vectorization) Given x, y ∈ X, find the g such that g ∗ x = y.
2. (Parallelization) Given x and y = g ∗ x, respond to a challenge z ∈ X, with g ∗ z.
3. (Parallel testing) Given a challenge set x, y, z, z′ ∈ X, such that y = g ∗ x, decide if
z′ = g ∗ z.
‘Hard’ and ‘Easy’ are evaluated according to the concrete examples. A basic parameter is
|G| = |X|. Since the Vectorization problem can be solved in exhaustive search in O(|X|1/2)
computations of the group action via the birthday paradox, a basic requirement is that
|X| must be large (exponential sized).
We give three examples of public key primitives enabled by a HHS: key exchange (emulating
Diffie-Hellman), encryption (emulating the Hashed Elgamal scheme), and a zero knowledge
identification protocol. We choose these examples in particular for comparison with the
supersingular cryptographic schemes of De Feo-Jao-Plut.
Key Exchange
The Key Exchange protocol generalizes the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
1. Public parameter: a basepoint x ∈ X
2. Alice chooses a random element a ∈ G, and computes ka = a ∗ x, sending this value
to Bob
3. Bob chooses a random element b ∈ G, and computes kb = b ∗ x, sending this value
to Alice
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4. Alice computes kAB = a ∗Kb, while Bob computes the same key kAB = b ∗KA.
Proposition 4.1.2. The key exchange is KP under an eavesdropping attack with a security
reduction to the parallelization problem.
Proof. (Sketch). Consider an algorithm A that can efficiently solve for the shared key with
an eavesdropping attack with sufficiently high probability. Consider also a random instance
of the Parallelization problem where we are given x ∈ X and y = g ∗ x and we are asked
to respond to a challenge z ∈ X with z′ = g ∗ z. Give A the inputs x, kA := y, kB := z. A
outputs a value kAB, which is z
′ with high probability.
Public Key Encryption
This protocol generalizes the Hashed Elgamal scheme, and is outlined in Stolbunov’s thesis.
1. Public parameters: Hash function H = {Hk} : X → {0, 1}w, public basepoint x ∈ X.
2. Key Generation: secret key sk ∈ G randomly chosen and public key pk = sk ∗ x,
k ∈ K.
3. Encryption: Choose a ∈ G. Then E(m) = (c, z) := (Hk(a ∗ pk)⊕m, a ∗ x).
4. Decryption: m = D(c, z) = Hk(sk ∗ z)⊕ c.
Proposition 4.1.3 ([32, Theorem 3.2]). The encryption scheme is IND-CPA under the
additional assumption that H is entropy smoothing, with a security reduction to the parallel
testing problem.
Identification Protocol
The protocol is a Σ-protocol. Peggy proves herself (via her identity gp ∈ G) to Victor as
follows:
1. Public parameters: public basepoint x ∈ X, public-key pk = gp ∗ x.
2. Peggy chooses a random r ∈ G and computes and transmits y = r ∗ pk.
3. Victor chooses a random challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
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4. If b = 0, Peggy reveals r and Victor checks that r ∗ pk = y, Else Peggy reveals
g = r ∗ gp and Victor checks that g ∗ x = y.
Proposition 4.1.4. [10, 4]The Σ-protocol is computationally zero knowledge with a secu-
rity reduction to the parallel testing problem, with soundness error not exceeding 1/2. It
can be repeated t times to achieve a soundness error bound of 1/2t.
4.1.2 The Cl(O)-torsor EllO(Fq) as a HHS
j(E)

// [a] ∗ j(E)

[b] ∗ j(E) // [a][b] ∗ j(E)
Figure 4.1: DH-type key exchange using ordinary curves
Here we briefly examine the conditions under which EllO(Fq) can be a HHS. The basic
requirement is that |EllO(Fq)| = h(O) is exponentially large. Writing hO as h∆, where
∆ = disc(O), we have
h(∆) = O(
√
∆ log(∆)). (4.1)
So |∆| needs to be of exponential size. However, even with the best algorithms today,
computing the group action — the complex multiplication operator — is subexponential
in log(|∆|) (and polynomial in the degree of the acting ideal). Thus encryption in any
possibly secure instance of this cryptography has limited performance. We overview a
strategy to compute the group action (part of which was discussed in Chapter 1), for it
will also have relevance for us later when we discuss destructive algorithms.
Computing the Group Action
Problem 4.1.5. Given a j(E) in EllO(Fq), and [a] ∈ Cl(O), compute [a] ∗ j(E).
As mentioned in Section 2, the strategy for computing this action involves factoring
[a] = [p1]
e1 [p2]
e2 ...[pn]
en (4.2)
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Algorithm 2 Computing the complex multiplication operator (template)
Input: ∆, q, [a], j(E)
Output: The element j(E ′) ∈ Ell∆(Fq) such that [a] ∗ j(E) = j(E ′)
1: Compute a factor base F = {p1, . . . , pn} of split prime ideals of norm ≤ B for some
specified B
2: Compute a vector e = (e1, . . . , en) of small L
1 norm such that [a] = [p1]
e1 [p2]
e2 . . . [pn]
en
3: Compute a sequence of (φ1, ..., φs) of isogenies such that the composition φc : E → Ec
of the sequence has kernel E[p1
e1 ...pn
en ] using the method of Algorithm 1 in Section 3
4: Return j(Ec)
where the pi are split prime ideals of small norm and ei are small exponents, and computing
sequentially the action of the split prime ideals. This step (Step 3) is computed in time
proportional to
∏ |ei|N(pi)2, so the time taken in this step depends on the ‘quality’ of the
factorization (Steps 1 and 2). Let us briefly discuss this.
The strategy is to compute a finite factor base F of split primes of bounded norm under
which all class group elements can decompose, i.e. for which:
Cl(O) =
⊗
F
pi. (4.3)
Classical theory (Minkowski’s bound) gives the existence of a factor base with norm bound
O(
√
∆), but under the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH), a factor base with a much
smaller norm bound applies.
Proposition 4.1.6 (Bach’s bound [1]). Under GRH, there is a factor base for Cl(O∆)
consisting of prime ideals of norm < 12 log2(∆).
However, there is the computational question of actually computing a decomposition 4.3
for an input ideal class [a], according to which the entries of vector of exponents e are
small. This requirement can establish a tradeoff with the norm bound B we choose: the
more split prime ideals we include, the more relations we can find efficiently, and the easier
it is to factor with small exponents.
This particular strategy was described by Broker, Charles, and Lauter [6]. Since then
different algorithms for factoring have been described [20, 8, 33] that work better for
different parameter choices, and based on different heuristics.
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Proposition 4.1.7. The algorithm of Childs, Jao, and Soukharev [8] based on the template
in Algorithm 2 has worst case running time of at most Lq(
1
2
,
√
3
2
), assuming only GRH.
Parameter Choices
Both Couveignes and Stolbunov proposed that the torsor be based around the maximal
order O = OK . Couveignes in fact proposes to choose parameters t, q such that the
discriminant of K = Q(
√
∆), where ∆ := t2 − 4q is squarefree, in which case the only
possibility for a curve E/Fq with trace t is O = OK . Naively, this stipulation seems
unnecessary, especially since the class number increases for suborders
hO = hKc[O∗K : O∗]
∏
p|c
(1− (K
p
)
p−1).
But this increase in cardinality is misleading. The vectorization problem in the suborder
O of OK can often easily reduce to a vectorization problem in OK . This reduction can be
viewed as a consequence of the structure of isogeny graphs for ordinary curves, and we’ll
explore it in the next chapter.
Note that finding the discriminant of the maximal order, which is necessary, e.g. for com-
puting the group action, involves computing and factoring ∆. In a randomized algorithm
for choosing a basepoint E0/Fq, the trace of Frobenius tq and hence ∆ can be determined
efficiently from Schoof’s point counting algorithm, but factoring can be hard, especially
when ∆ is a product of large primes. The only situation that is reasonable is when ∆ is a
product of a large prime and several small ones.
4.2 Cryptography based on Supersingular Curves
4.2.1 Overview
The supersingular protocols of De Feo-Jao-Plut are inspired by the protocols in the ordi-
nary case in that they are also based on legitimate parties being able to compute a shared
commutative diagram with knowledge of a subset of the arrows — isogenies —- that hold
the secret kernels 〈R〉 and 〈S〉. In the ordinary case it is ideal classes, and their commuta-
tivity, that makes this shared construction possible. In this supersingular setting, despite
the non-commutativity of the endomorphism ring, legitimate parties can still establish the
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E
// E/〈S〉

E/〈R〉 // E/〈S,R〉
(4.4)
Figure 4.2: Principle behind De Feo-Jao-Plut schemes
square (4.4) by transmitting auxiliary information that is conjectured not to compromise
their secrets.
Not only are their schemes a candidate for post-quantum cryptography, it also beats the
ordinary protocols from a performance standpoint.
4.2.2 Parameters
It is the very particular parameter choices that makes the cryptography possible. The
following are computed as setup
1. The characteristic of the prime subfield of the curves p is a large prime of the form
leAA l
eB
B f ± 1, where f is a cofactor. These primes are known to be dense [24], so for
any choice of lA, lB, eA, eB, a simple trial and error algorithm finds a prime of this
form.
2. The base point E/Fp2 is a supersingular curve over Fp2 cardinality (leAA l
eB
B f)
2. Such
a curve can be computed efficiently via an algorithm of Broker [5].
3. Torsion bases PA, QA of E[l
eA
A ] and PB, QB of E[l
eB
B ] can be computed efficiently
via a simple randomized algorithm that scales random points of E, and tests linear
independence via the Weil pairing [31, III.8]
The information p, E, lA, eA, lB, eB, PA, PB, QA, QB are all public parameters of the system.
The secrets 〈S〉 (resp 〈R〉) are cyclic subgroups of the leA−1A (lA + 1) full cyclic subgroups
possible in E[leAA ] (resp l
eB−1
B (lB + 1) in E[l
eB
B ]. The cofactor f has to be sufficiently small
that these are large.
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4.2.3 Protocols
Key Exchange
1. Alice randomly chooses two elements mA, nA ∈ Z/leAA Z, not both divisible by lA, and
computes KA = 〈[mA]PA + [mB]PB〉, the kernel of an isogeny φA : E → EA. She
transmits to Bob EA as well as the auxiliary input φA(PB), φA(QB), the image of the
other torsion base under the secret isogeny.
2. Bob randomly chooses two elements mB, nB ∈ Z/leBB Z, not both divisible by lB, and
computes KB = 〈[mB]PB + [nB]QB〉, the kernel of the secret isogeny φB : E → EB.
He transmits to Alice EB as well as φB(PA), φB(QA).
3. With the auxiliary input, Alice computes an isogeny φ′A : EB → EAB with kernel
〈[mA]φB(PA) + [nA]φB(QA)〉. Bob proceeds similarly to compute an isogeny φ′B with
kernel 〈[mB]φA(PB) + [mB]φA(QB)〉.
4. φ′B ◦ φA ∼= φA ◦ φB, and in particular these compositions have isomorphic codomain
EAB = E0/〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA, [mB]PB + [nB]QB〉
and the j-invariant of this curve is the secret key.
The auxiliary input provides an eavesdropper with the ability to evaluate φA on all of
E[leBB ] (resp φA on E[l
eA
A ]). This same information is revealed in all the protocols of De
Feo-Jao-Plut. However, it is conjectured that this leakage reveals no essential information
about φA or φB.
Public Key Encryption
1. Additional public parameter: a Hash function H = {Hk}k∈K : Fp2 → {0, 1}w.
2. Key generation: Choose random elements mA, nA ∈ Z/leAA Z, not both divisible by
lA, as well as a random key index k ∈ K. Compute φA as before. The public key is
(EA, φA(PB), φA(QB), k) and the private key is (mA, nA, k).
3. Encryption: Randomly choose mB, nB ∈ Z/leBB , and compute φ′B : EA → EAB as
before. Then
E(m) = (c := Hk(j(EAB)⊕m,EB, φB(PA), φB(QA)). (4.5)
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4. Decryption: Compute φ′A : EB → EAB as before. Then recover m = Hk(j(EAB))⊕ c.
Identification Protocol
In this Σ-protocol, Peggy wants to prove herself via her identity S, a secret leAA torsion
point defining an isogeny φ : E → E/〈S〉.
1. In addition to a torsion base P,Q of E[leBB ], their images φ(P ), φ(Q) become part of
the public parameters of the protocol.
2. Peggy chooses a primitive leBB torsion point R and computes a square (4.4). She sends
E/〈R〉 and E/〈S,R〉 as commitment.
3. Victor selects a random bit challenge b ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If b = 0, Peggy reveals the points R and φ(R). Victor accepts if they have order
leBB and generate the kernels of the isogenies E → E/〈R〉 and E/〈S〉 → E/〈S,R〉
respectively.
5. If b = 1, Peggy reveals the points ψ(S), where ψ : E/〈R〉 → E/〈S,R〉 in the
square. Victor accepts if it has order leAA and generates the kernel of the isogeny
E/〈R〉 → E/〈S,R〉.
4.2.4 Performance
These protocols are much faster than the ones proposed for ordinary case. In particular
the analagous step to computing the complex multiplication operator is to compute, for a
random point R of order le, the codomain of the isogeny φ : E → E/〈R〉 as well as evaluate
φ it on auxiliary input points. Naively, applying Velu’s formulas to retrieve φ explicitly
is a O(leii ) = O(
√
p) algorithm in time and space, and therefore impractical. However,
retrieving φ ‘wholly’ is not required. φ is a composition of l-isogenies. Finding such an
e-length chain and ‘pushing’ the evaluation of an auxiliary point is simpler, and we can
describe it by via an iterative process:
Lemma 4.2.1. Set E0 = E, R0 = R of order l
e, P0 = P an auxiliary point, and for
0 ≤ i < e, let
Ei+1 = Ei/〈[le−i−1]Ri〉, φi : Ei → Ei+1 Ri = φi(Ri) Pi+1 = φi(Pi).
Then φ = φe−1 ◦ · · · ◦ φ0, so in particular Ee−1 = E/〈R〉.
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If we have to compute [le−i−1]Ri from Ri at each stage of the iteration, it results in an
algorithm with quadratic complexity in e. Although this is already feasible, in practice
this can still be improved significantly
R0
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
[l]R0
[l2]R0
[l3]R0
[l4]R0
[l5]R0
[l4]R1 [l
3]R2 [l
2]R3 [l]R4
φ0
φ0
φ0
φ0
φ0
φ1
φ1
φ1
φ1
φ2
φ2
φ2
φ3
φ3 φ4
Figure 4.3: A ‘balanced strategy’ where R0 has order l
6; only the bold edges are computed
This diagram represents the iterative process. Each node represents a scalar multiple of
Ri that might be explicitly computed. To compute each new rational map φi, we have to
‘reach’ the node [li]Ri and apply Velu’s formula. Notably, one does not need to compute
the values of all the nodes. Consider the subset of the edges in the figure indicative by the
bold line, and consider a depth first search through that particular subgraph starting from
the top, with a left-first order. In this search, to traverse a positive sloping edge invokes the
cost of a scalar multiple of l times a point, and to traverse a downward sloping edge invokes
the cost of an evaluation of a rational map at a point. When the bottom row is reached,
Velu’s formula is applied with the given kernel in order to retrieve the rational map that
allows one to move right. Such a ‘balanced strategy’ (named for the symmetry in the
cost tree) has 1
2 log 2
n log(n) edges as opposed to n(n−1)
2
, thus saving heavily in performance
cost. One can improve slightly beyond the balanced strategy: the authors of [12] describe
an efficient dynamic programming algorithm for the optimal strategy with respect to any
measure of cost of, respectively, computing a scalar multiple of a point, and evaluating a
degree l map at a point.
4.2.5 Underlying Computational Problems
We consider first the problem that, analogous to the vectorization problem, constitutes a
total break to all the protocols at once if solved efficiently.
Problem 4.2.2 (Computational Supersingular Isogeny (CSSI) problem [12]). Let φA :
E0 → EA be an isogeny whose kernel is 〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA〉, where mA, nA are chosen at
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random from Z/leAA Z and not both divisible by lA. Given EA and the values φA(PB), φA(QB),
find a generator RA of 〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA〉.
The reason any generator RA is sufficient is that the extended discrete logarithm problem
RA = [mA]PA + [nA]QA is easy for E0, a curve with smooth order.
There is another problem that, for these schemes, is also an ‘underlying’ problem in that its
solution would compromises multiple security objectives and undermine the identification
protocol completely.
Problem 4.2.3 (Decisional Supersingular Isogeny (DSSI) Problem [12]). Let EA be an
another isogenous curve defined over Fp2. Decide whether EA is leAA -isogenous to E0.
Later we will consider whether algorithms for supersingular elliptic curves help to solve
these problems in particular.
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Chapter 5
Algorithms for Isogeny Problems and
Isogeny Based Cryptography
5.1 Algorithmic Paradigm: Navigating Isogeny Graphs
Consider the most general isogeny problem:
Problem 5.1.1. Given curves E1, E2 that are known to be isogenous, compute an isogeny
φ : E1 → E2.
Lemma 5.1.2 ([35, 6.9]). Any isogeny can be decomposed into a sequence of isogenies of
prime degree.
Because of the above lemma, a major algorithmic strategy for resolving the isogeny prob-
lem, in the finite field case, involves computing a sequence of isogenies {φi}ni=1 of prime
degree to intermediate curves such that:
φn ◦ ... ◦ φ1 : E1 → E2.
For example, a basic walking algorithm ‘navigates’ the isogeny class of E0 with prime
degree isogeny ‘steps’ until arriving at E1. Such a strategy motivates the usefulness of
isogeny graphs: graphs whose vertex sets are curves of an isogeny class (up to a specified
isomorphism) and whose edge sets are isogenies (again, up to isomorphism) of degrees from
a specified set of primes. The ‘isogeny problem’ can be recast as a problem of finding a
path in the graph. The key question is:
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Question 5.1.3. How does an isogeny graph exhibit structure that can be exploited for an
algorithm to solve an isogeny problem?
A second key question is the nature of the solution obtained by an algorithm.
Question 5.1.4. What are the consequences of the algorithms obtained for isogeny based
cryptography?
This chapter addresses both these questions. We separate the discussion of ordinary and
supersingular curves, not only because they are always in distinct isogeny classes, but
because their isogeny graphs display different structure.
5.2 The Ordinary Case
5.2.1 Levels and Volcanoes
The material in this subsection is primarily based on [34].
Isogeny graphs of ordinary curves exhibit a highly visual structure that can be exploited
for an algorithm. Suppose we are investigating an isogeny problem for curves and isogenies
defined over Fq. Then the Fq isogeny class they belong to is characterized by trace:
Ellt(Fq) := {j(E) : E/Fq | tr(piE) = t}.
Ellt(Fq) will be the vertex set of an isogeny graph. These points can be helpfully placed
visually in ‘levels’ depending on the endomorphism ring. The levels are the sets from the
following disjoint union:
Ellt(Fq) =
⊔
Z[pi]⊆O⊆OK
EllO(Fq). (5.1)
where the Frobenius element pi is always the same in the endomorphism algebra K = Q(t2−
4q). Each endomorphism order O above is O = Z+ cOK for c|cpi, where cpi := [OK : Z[pi]].
c is the conductor for the order O.
Each torsor EllO(Fq) above constitutes a level and we place a particular torsor EllO1(Fq)
above EllO2(Fq) if the conductor of the former is strictly smaller than the latter.
Separable prime degree isogenies have a visual meaning from this placement of curves.
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End(E) = Z[piE] = Z + 6OK
End(E) = Z + 3OK
End(E) = Z + 2OK
End(E) = OK
Figure 5.1: Level structure where [OK : Z[pi]] = 6
Notation 5.2.1. For the rest of this section, l will denote a prime such that l 6= char(Fq).
Proposition 5.2.2. For any l-isogeny φ : E → E ′, we have either
End(E) = End(E ′)
[End(E) : End(E ′)] = l
[End(E ′) : End(E)] = l. (5.2)
Thus it is meaningful to talk of φ as horizontal, descending, or ascending (the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd case respectively in (5.2)). Furthermore
Proposition 5.2.3. Every horizontal l-isogeny is induced by an ideal l over l in the endo-
morphism ring.
Now for such a prime l, we can consider the vertex set Ellt(Fq) with an edge set of Fq-
rational l-isogenies, to produce the isogeny graph Gl,t(Fq). This graph can be considered
undirected because every l-isogeny enables a dual isogeny of the same degree (note that a
solution to an isogeny problem is directed, so we may have to take duals when computing
an isogeny as a path).
A major theorem is that the ordinary components of Gl,t(Fq) are strongly classified as
volcanoes :
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Definition 5.2.4. An l-volcano V is a connected undirected graph whose vertices are
partitioned into one or more levels V0, ..., Vd such that:
1. the subgraph on V0 (the surface) is a regular graph of degree at most 2.
2. For i > 0, each vertex in Vi has exactly one neighbor in level Vi−1, and this accounts
for every edge not on the surface.
3. For i < d, each vertex in Vi has degree l + 1.
For d = 0, V is a connected regular graph of degree at most 2.
Figure 5.2: Example of a 2-volcano
The fact that the components of the l-isogeny graph are volcanoes has major implications
on ‘travelling’ with l-isogenies, such as:
1. It is only possible to traverse horizontally on the surface of the volcano.
2. For a curve not on the surface, there is a unique way to ascend.
3. At the floor of the volcano, there is only one way to traverse: ascend.
The precise theorem is as follows.
Theorem 5.2.5. Let V be an ordinary component of Gl,t(Fq) that does not contain 0 or
1728. Then V is an l-volcano for which:
1. Vertices in Vi have endomorphism ring Oi.
2. l - [OK : O0] and [Oi : Oi+1] = l.
3. The depth of V is vl(cpi).
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4. If l is inert in O0, |V0| = 1. Otherwise |V0| = ord([l]), where l is a prime ideal in O0
over l.
5. Every vertex in vi has
h(Oi+1)
h(Oi) children. Furthermore, by arbitarily identifying a
parent-child pair vi, vi+1 with the class group identities (1Cl(Oi+1), 1Cl(Oi)), the chil-
dren of a certain vertex vi ∈ Vi are the coset of the kernel of the projection ρ :
Cl(Oi+1)→ Cl(Oi). This kernel is generated by an invertible ideal of norm l2.
Given the volcano structure, the best available algorithm to the general isogeny problem
for ordinary curves E1 and E2 has the following outline:
1. Compute an ascending chain of isogenies from E1, E2 to E
′
1, E
′
2 respectively, where
E ′1 and E
′
2 are curves with maximal order OK .
2. Solve a vectorization problem for E ′1 and E
′
2 in OK and apply it (using e.g. [20],
based on the template of algorithm 2).
The algorithm can be considered computing a path in the isogeny graph GL,t(Fq), with the
given vertex set and edge set of isogenies with degrees from L:
L = S ∪ F (5.3)
where S is the set of primes that divide the conductor cpi (some of which are required to
ascend) and F is a factor base of Elkies primes below a certain bound (described in the
next section).
Step 1 is based on algorithms of Kohel [21], who was the first to use the volcano structure
for algorithms. We will not describe it in detail but remark that it can be totally infeasible
if cpi contains large prime factors, and constitute the bottleneck of the overall algorithm.
However, as Galbraith, Hess, and Smart [17] remark, on average cpi is both ‘small and
smooth’, and Kohel’s algorithm is typically extremely efficient, so is not included in the
runtime of the algorithm.
Note that this level/volcano structure hints that there is no real security advantage, in for
example the protocols of Couveignes, to be gained by encrypting in any order than the
maximal order OK . For example, consider encyrpting using the order O′ = Z + lOK, for
l a small prime. Because the projection homomorphism ρ : Cl(O′) → Cl(O) has a known
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kernel generated by an ideal of norm l2, and ascending is easy via Kohel’s algorithm, the
vectorization problem in O′ reduces polynomially to the problem in OK .
The expected bottleneck of the algorithm is solving the vectorization problem. We will
overview the best classical and quantum solutions to this problem.
5.2.2 Classical Algorithm for the Vectorization Problem: The
Algorithm of Galbraith-Hess-Smart
Problem 5.2.6. Given E1, E2/Fq ordinary elliptic curves satisfying #E1(Fq) = #E2(Fq),
and End(E1) = End(E2) = OK, the maximal order in the endomorphism algebra K of the
curves, find an ideal class [s] ∈ Cl(OK) such that [s] ∗ j(E0) = j(E1)
The state-of-the-art classical algorithm for the vectorization problem is exponential-time,
and is due to Galbraith and Stolbunov [15], based on the algorithm of Galbraith, Hess and
Smart (GHS) [17]. We recap just a basic version of GHS here, which captures the major
idea of the algorithm (and is close to the performance of the best algorithm).
The GHS algorithm is based on a pair of random walks from j1 = j(E1) and j2 = j(E2)
of small prime degree. The walking ‘steps’ are with isogenies with degrees from a set F of
Elkies primes whose prime ideal factors generate Cl(OK). The intermediate j-invariants
and isogeny paths leading to them are recorded because a collision of any walk with an-
other’s historical ‘journey’ can resolve the Vectorization problem. The paths to an inter-
mediate j-invariant are recorded by an ideal a. However, a key point that reduces the
algorithmic complexity is that a does not represent the ‘true’ path, potentially massive in
length, to that j-invariant, but an equivalent one, deduced by smoothing out the ideals in
the class group at each step of the walk.
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Algorithm 3 GHS algorithm for Vectorization: basic version
Input: j1, j2, Fq and ∆K = disc(K), B < 6 log(|∆K |)2
Output: [s] ∈ Cl(OK) such that [s] ∗ j0 = j1
1: Set F = { primes l < B|(−p
l
) = 1}
2: Set j01 ← j1, j02 ← j2, a01 ← [1], a02 ← [1], m← 0
3: while jm1 6∈ S2 and jm2 6∈ S1 do
4: Randomly draw l1, l2 ∈ F
5: Randomly walk one-step from the latest j-invariants with the given degrees , i.e.
(j∗1 , a1
∗)← ONE-STEP (jm1 , am1 , l1) and (j∗2 , a2∗)← ONE-STEP (jm2 , am2 , l2)
6: Increment m and set (jm1 , a
m
1 ) = (j
∗
1 , a
∗
1) and (j
m
2 , a
m
2 ) = (j
∗
2 , a
∗
2)
7: Append (jm1 , a
m
1 ) to S1 and (j
m
2 , a
m
2 ) to S2
8: end while
9: [There must be a collision in the walk]
10: if jm1 ∈ S2 (resp jm2 ∈ S1) then
11: find index i in S2 where collision occcured (resp k in S1). Then j
m
1 = j
i
2 (resp
jm2 = j
k
1 ). Compute s
′ = am1 a
−i
2 (resp. s
′ = a−m2 a
k
1)
12: end if
13: Solve and return s, the reduced ideal of s′
Algorithm 4 ONE-STEP
Input: j, a, l,∆K ,Fq
Output: Random Fq-rational path of degree l
1: Randomly choose j∗, a root of Φl(j,X)
2: Find the ideal l of norm l inducing an isogeny j → j∗ via the SEA technique (Algorithm
1)
3: Solve a∗, the reduced ideal of la
4: Output (j∗, a∗)
Lemma 5.2.7. [17, 3.3]Each step of the walk (ONE-STEP) requires at most O((log q) log(|∆K |)4 =
O((log q)5) field operations.
Lemma 5.2.8. [17, 3.3] The while loop in Algorithm 3 is expected to terminate after√
pih∆K/2 = O((log q)q
1/4) iterations by the birthday paradox.
Corollary 5.2.9. [17, 3.3]The overall complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(q1/4+).
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5.2.3 Subexponential Quantum Algorithm for Vectorization: The
Algorithm of Childs-Jao-Soukharev
Algorithm 5 Quantum algorithm of Childs-Jao-Soukharev [8]
Input: A finite field Fq, a discriminant ∆ < 0, and Weierstrass equations of horizontally
isogenous elliptic curve E1, E2
Output: [s] ∈ Cl(∆) such that [s] ∗ j(E0) = j(E1)
1: Decompose (via a quantum algorithm) Cl(∆) = 〈[b1]〉⊕ ...⊕〈[bk]〉, where |〈[bj|〉| = nj
2: Solve the hidden shift problem defined by the functions f0, f1 : Zn1 × ... × Znk →
Ellq,n(O∆) satisfying fc(x1, ..., xk) = ([b1]x1 ...[bk]xk) ∗ j(Ec), giving some (s1, ..., sk) ∈
Zn1 × ...× Znk
3: Output [s] = [b1]
s1 ...[bk]
sk
The main idea of this quantum algorithm is to recast the Vectorization problem as an
instance of the abelian hidden shift problem.
Problem 5.2.10 (Hidden Abelian Shift Problem). Given an abelian group A and a set of
S and two injective functions f, g : A → S with the property that:
f(a) = g(a+ s) for all a ∈ A (5.4)
for some ‘hidden shift’ s, deduce s given oracle access to A.
A crucial part of the quantum complexity for this black-box problem is its quantum query
complexity, which refers to how many times f and g are (quantumly) queried (this query
complexity, as well as quantum time and space complexities, are all formalized in the
quantum circuit model of quantum algorithms). A single query has ‘unit cost’, unlike in
the concrete instance of the problem.
Two different quantum solutions to this black box problem have different query and space
complexities.
Proposition 5.2.11 (Kuperberg [23]). The abelian hidden shift problem has a quantum
algorithm with time and query complexity 2O(
√
n), where n is the length of the output,
uniformly for all finitely generated abelian groups.
Proposition 5.2.12 (Regev [25]). There is a quantum algorithm that finds s with time
and query complexity L|A|(12 ,
√
2) using space poly(log |A|).
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The vectorization problem is framed as hidden shift by setting the following f, g : Cl(OK)→
EllOK (Fq)
f([b]) = [b] ∗ j(E1) (5.5)
g([b]) = [b] ∗ j(E0) (5.6)
Then the hidden shift [s] with the property f([a]) = g([a][s]) is evidently the solution to
the Vectorization problem [s] ∗ j(E0) = j(E1).
As a concrete instance of hidden shift, we now have to multiply the query complexity with
the time taken to evaluate f and g. Each query involves evaluating the complex multipli-
cation operator, which is a subexponential time algorithm. The point is, a subexponential
number of queries to a subexponential time algorithm gives an overall subexponential time
complexity.
Proposition 5.2.13. Assuming GRH, Algorithm 5 runs in time Lq(
1
2
,
√
3
2
) using a reduc-
tion to Kuperberg’s Algorithm for Step 2, and time Lq(
1
2
,
√
3
2
+
√
2), using a reduction to
Regev’s algorithm.
This result obviously threatens the post-quantum security of the isogeny-based crypto-
graphic schemes of Couveignes and Stolbunov.
Note that nothing is gained classically by recasting the vectorization problem as hidden
shift, because the hidden shift problem offers no better classical solution than a generic
brute force attack with an exponential number of queries. That the hidden abelian shift
offers a subexponential quantum solution is indicative of the power of quantum computers
to do something better than classical algorithms. Indeed, many computational problems
involving periodic properties exhibit, in the quantum setting, an improvement from a
classical brute force strategy through such a reduction.
5.3 The Supersingular Case
5.3.1 Expander property; Meet in the Middle Algorithm
The ‘full’ supersingular isogeny graph displays very different properties from the ordinary
case. Consider Ell(F¯p), the set of supersingular j-invariants defined over Fp. We highlight
two basic differences to the ordinary case.
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Lemma 5.3.1 ([13]). The j-invariants in Ell(F¯p) are all defined over Fp2. The size of this
set is: ⌊ p
12
⌋
+

0 : p ≡ 1 mod 12
1 : p ≡ 5, 7 mod 12
2 : p ≡ 11 mod 12.
(5.7)
Thus, any supersingular graph over F¯p is finite, whereas a ‘full’ ordinary graph — whose
vertices consist of every non-supersingular j-invariant in F¯p — is infinite. The other major
difference is that Ell(F¯p) constitutes a single F¯p-isogeny class. In fact, more is true. For
any prime l 6= p, consider the l-isogeny graph Gl(F¯p) with vertex set Ell(F¯p) and edge set
of l-isogenies, where the isogenies are defined over F¯p.
Proposition 5.3.2. [13] Gl(Fp) is a fully connected regular graph of degree l + 1.
Therefore, and very much unlike the ordinary case, an isogeny problem can be resolved
by chaining l-isogenies for any prime l 6= p. Gl(Fp) has been known to display even more
structure as an expander graph. This is a ‘well connectedness’ property that implies the
general isogeny problem always has a solution with short paths.
Definition 5.3.3. An expander graph with N vertices has expansion constant c > 0, if
for any subset U ⊆ V of size |U | ≤ N
2
, the boundary Γ(U) satisfies |Γ(U)| ≥ c|U |.
Proposition 5.3.4 ([22, 4.1]). An expander graph with N vertices has diameter O(logN).
Therefore Gl(Fp) has diameter O(log p). This motivates Galbraith’s ‘meet in the middle’
algorithm. It is similar to the bidirectional GHS algorithm for Vectorization, but more
primitive. For one, we can stick to just moving with isogenies of a fixed prime degree.
Secondly, we cannot represent paths by ideals (let alone reduced ideals), so the issue of
space is amplified. The resulting algorithm is O(p1/2) in time and space, and was the state-
of-the-art for the supersingular isogeny problem until the revelation of Delfs and Galbraith
[13] in 2013.
5.3.2 Result of Delfs and Galbraith: Partial Reintroduction of
‘Ordinary’ Structure
Although the full supersingular graph displays very different structure to the ordinary case,
Delfs and Galbraith noticed that a certain kind of isogeny graph in the supersingular re-
sembles the ordinary case, and can be helpfully exploited for an algorithm. This subsection
summarizes their discoveries in [13].
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Delfs and Galbraith discovered this structure appears when consideration is entirely re-
stricted to the prime subfield Fp. That is, not only does one only consider curves over Fp,
but we also consider exclusively the subset of morphisms — isomorphisms, endomorphisms,
and other isogenies — defined over Fp. The relevant vertex set is:
Ell(Fp) = {supersingular curves over Fp up to Fp isomorphism}. (5.8)
In this case, twist classes constitute different vertices.
Lemma 5.3.5. Each supersingular j invariant ∈ Fp corresponds to two different twist
classes. As a consequence
|Ell(Fp)| = 2 ∗
(
#jp =

1
2
h(−4p) : p ≡ 1 mod 4
h(−p) : p ≡ 7 mod 8
2h(−p) : p ≡ 3 mod 8
)
(5.9)
Note that this vertex set constitutes an Fp-isogeny class, since every supersingular curve
over Fp has exactly p+ 1 points.
The older number theoretic result that sparks the insight into the structure possible in an
isogeny graph for this vertex set is the following. Let E/Fp a curve. Then although the
full endomorphism ring End(E) is a maximal order in a quaternion algebra, the subring of
endomorphisms defined over Fp, denoted EndFp(E), resembles the endomorphism ring for
ordinary curves
Theorem 5.3.6. Let E/Fp be a supersingular curve. Then EndFp(E) is an order in
Q(piE) = Q(
√−p).
Corollary 5.3.7. Let E/Fp a supersingular curve. Then
1. if p ≡ 1 mod 4, EndFp(E) = Z[piE] = Z[
√−p] = OK;
2. if p ≡ 3 mod 4, EndFp(E) = Z[piE] = Z[
√−p] or EndFp(E) = OK = Z[1+
√−p
2
], and
cpi = 2.
Thus, the vertices Ell(Fp) can be considered to be in levels as in the ordinary case (admit-
tedly there is no insight to be gained from this alone when p ≡ 1 mod 4, where there is
just one level). However, the fact that gives a complete transplanting of the ordinary case
is that each level is again a torsor of the relevant class group, and the ordinary ‘volcano’
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picture also transfers completely. This is deduced via the Deuring lifting and reduction to
complex curves, and in particular the correspondence{
supersingular elliptic
curves over Fp
}
←→
{
elliptic curves E over C
with End(E) ∈ {Z[√−p],OK}
}
,

Fp-rational `-isogenies
between supersingular
elliptic curves over Fp
 ←→

`-isogenies between
elliptic curves E over C
with End(E) ∈ {Z[√−p],OK}
 . (5.10)
A full description of the structure is given by Delfs and Galbraith as follows.
Theorem 5.3.8. Let p > 3 be a prime.
1. p ≡ 1 mod 4: There are h(−4p) Fp-isomorphism classes of supersingular curves
over Fp, all having the same Fp endomorphism ring Z[
√−p]. From every one there
is an outgoing Fp-rational horizontal 2-isogeny as well as two l-isogenies for every
prime l > 2 with (−p
l
) = 1.
2. p ≡ 3 mod 4: There are two levels in the supersingular isogeny graph. From each
vertex there are two horizontal l-isogenies for every prime l > 2 with (−p
l
) = 1.
(a) If p ≡ 7 mod 8, on each level h(−p) vertices are situated. Surface and floor are
connected 1 : 1 with 2-isogenies and on the surface we also have two horizontal
2-isogenies from each vertex.
(b) If p ≡ 3 mod 8, we have h(−p) vertices on the surface and 3h(−p) on the
floor. Surface and floor are connected 1 : 3 with 2-isogenies, and there are no
horizontal 2-isogenies.
Following this structure, the following template for an algorithm to the general supersin-
gular isogeny problem for E1 to E2 presents itself:
1. From E1 to E2, possibly defined over Fp2 , compute isogenies to E ′1 and E ′2 defined
over Fp.
2. Compute an isogeny between E ′1 and E
′
2 using algorithms from the ordinary case.
The algorithm can be viewed as computing a path in the isogeny graph X (Fp,L), with the
vertex set Ell(Fp) and L = 2 ∪ F where F is a set of Elkies primes generating the class
group Cl(OK).
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Delfs and Galbraith describe a classical algorithm for the supersingular isogeny problem
following this template that improves to O(p1/4) time complexity if the curves are defined
over Fp, and has a O(p1/2) time complexity with the bottleneck of Step 1. Nevertheless, it
will have better space complexity than the meet in the middle approach.
We discuss a quantum algorithm based on this template. We can avail of quantum com-
ponents for both Stage 1 and 2.
5.4 A Quantum Algorithm for the Supersingular Isogeny
Problem
5.4.1 Overview
The algorithm is joint work with Biasse and Jao [2]. The algorithm strategy can be
understood in terms of the following schematic (Figure 5.3), which represents a path in
the isogeny graph.
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Figure 5.3: Schematic of quantum algorithm for supersingular isogeny problem
The only essentially new step in Algorithm 6 is Step 1. Note that that the ascension in
Step 2, which is occasionally insurmountable in the ordinary case, is trivial for us: the
maximal order is of a known discriminant and it is trivial to take a 2-isogeny to it.
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Algorithm 6 Quantum algorithm to compute isogeny between supersingular curves over
a finite field
Input: Supersingular curves E1, E2 defined over some finite field Fpn
Output: An isogeny ψ : E1 → E2
1: Compute isogenies φ1 : E1 → E ′1 and φ2 : E2 → E ′2, where E ′1, E ′2 are defined over Fp,
using the quantum random walk algorithm
2: If p ≡ 3 mod 4, ascend E ′1, E ′2 to the maximal order in the Fp endomorphism ring (call
the new curves E1, E2)
3: Solve the vectorization problem between E ′1, E
′
2 using the Algorithm 5 to find an ideal
class [a] such that [a] ∗ E ′1 = E ′2
4: Compute the action [a] using an algorithm based on the template of Algorithm 2, e.g.
[8], to find an induced isogeny φ[a]
5: Return φˆ2 ◦ φ[a] ◦ φ1
5.4.2 Quantum Random Walk
First we discuss a classical random walk. Consider randomly walking from a curve E/Fp2
with l-isogenies on the ‘full’ supersingular graph Gl(F¯p). Intuitively, the chances of success
of landing in a curve in E ′/Fp depend on the density of the latter set, i.e. the density of the
vertices Gl(F¯p)
⋂
Fp. Because the isogeny graph Gl(F¯p) is an expander, a certain density
is guaranteed. The isogeny graph Gl(F¯p) is a distinguished type of regular expander graph
known as a Ramanujan graph. Without going into detail about this property (which is
properly defined in spectral graph theory), we quote the standard result about random
walks in such a graph.
Lemma 5.4.1 ([19]). Let G be a Ramanujan graph of degree k on N vertices. Let S be
any subset of the vertices of G, and x be any vertex of G. Then a random walk of length
at least
log 2N/|S|1/2
log k/(2
√
k − 1)
starting from x will land in S with probability at least |S|
2N
.
We can apply this lemma to a walk with 3-isogenies, i.e. in the graph G3(F¯p). In this case
obviously k = l + 1 = 4, |N | ≥ p/12 by (5.9), and
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|S| = #jp =

1
2
h(−4p) : p ≡ 1 mod 4
h(−p) : p ≡ 7 mod 8
2h(−p) : p ≡ 3 mod 8.
(5.11)
These numbers can be well approximated. Under the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis,
the class number of the maximal order of Q(
√−d) satisfies
h(d) ≥ (1 + o(1)) pi
12eγ
√
d
log log(d)
. (5.12)
Using direct substitution into (5.4.1), it is easily verified that
Proposition 5.4.2. Under GRH, a random 3-isogeny path of length
λ ≥
(
log( 2√
6eγ
p3/4)
log( 2√
3
)
(5.13)
passes through a supersingular j invariant over Fp with probability at least
τ :=
pi
12
1
p1/2
. (5.14)
From this, elementary probability theory establishes that M independent random walks
from a curve has success probability 1− (1− τ)M . Therefore:
Lemma 5.4.3. M := log(2) e
γ
pi
p1/2 independent walks of length λ will pass through a su-
persingular curve with probability ≥ 1
2
.
Each walk is of length O(log p) and computing each 3-isogeny step of the walk takes a
constant amount of field operations with the aid of the modular polynomial Φ3(X, Y ), so
each walk has O(log p) time complexity. Thus the cost of M = O(p1/2) classical walks is,
suppressing logarithmic factors, O˜(p1/2).
Using Grover’s Search
The classical result is improved quadratically by walking quantumly. The walk is based on
the famous Grover’s search black-box problem:
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Problem 5.4.4 (Grover’s search). Given a Boolean function on a domain of size N
f : [1, ..., N ]→ {0, 1} (5.15)
and the existence of an index i such that f(i) = 1, find such an i, given oracle access to f .
This problem formalizes the situation of searching a completely unsorted database of N
items for some particular element i. Classically, there is no better way to do this search
than brute force — the problem is Ω(N). However,
Theorem 5.4.5. [18] There exists a quantum algorithm that computes a good index i with
time and query complexity O(
√
N), with probability 1− 1/N .
We can naturally recast the problem as a Grover’s search where the indices are the M
walks and a good index is a sucessful walk. Formalizing this search, as a precomputation
we generate a random injection
g : [1, ..., N ]→ {3− isogeny paths of length λ starting from E}. (5.16)
Each element on the right could be represented by a string of, for example, members of
{0,1,2}, which represent the roots of the modular polynomial Φ3(j,X) at each point of the
walk. Each such representation will be O(log p) in length. The search function is then
Cf (x) :=
{
1 if f(x) passes through a supersingular j − invariant ∈ Fp
0 otherwise.
(5.17)
As part of a Grover’s search algorithm, Cf may be called O(
√
p1/2) = O(p1/4) times. Each
call involves O((log p)2) cost in time. Thus, supressing logarithmic factors, we have:
Proposition 5.4.6. The quantum random walk algorithm runs in time O˜(p1/4), with suc-
cess probability close to 1/2 (in particular, certainly greater than 1/4).
Proposition 5.4.7. The overall algorithm 6 has quantum complexity O˜(p1/4) and Lp(
1
2
,
√
3
2
)
in the case E1 and E2 are defined over Fp.
Proof. When E1 and E2 are defined over Fp, the only step involved is the quantum algo-
rithm of Childs, Jao, and Soukharev. Noting the algorithmic complexity of that algorithm
in Proposition 5.2.13, we see that for the relevant torsor here it is Lp(
1
2
,
√
3
2
). When either
curve is not defined over Fp, the quantum random walk is the bottleneck, with exponential
complexity O˜(p1/4).
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5.4.3 Cryptographic Implications
The quantum attack has direct implications for constructions whose security is premised
on the difficulty of computing any isogeny between two supersingular elliptic curves, such
as the Charles-Goren-Lauter hash function [7].
However, it has little post-quantum implications (as yet) for the De Feo-Jao-Plut schemes,
for the algorithm provides no control over the degree. For example, suppose we give to
the algorithm the inputs E and EA from the CSSI problem. The algorithm returns an
unspecified isogeny between E and EA, whereas the CSSI problem requires one to retrieve
a particular isogeny of degree leAA .
The only possibly inescure case for the CSSI problem is where all the following hold si-
multaenously: The basepoint E is chosen over Fp and the secret isogeny φA : E → EA is
‘accidentally’ defined Fp, and in addition φA is the induced action by a (in the sense of the
‘parent’ operator ? mentioned in Chapter 3, so φa = φA). Then our algorithm on inputs E
and EA solves a vectorization problem between the two, and it retrieves an ideal a
′. This
ideal a′ may have the ‘wrong’ norm distinct from leii , but necessarily a
′ ∈ [a], so a = (α)a′.
We can then experiment with post-composing a′ with principal ideals (α) of norm l
ei
i
N(a′) in
order to retrieve a.
From rudimentary experiments, it is found that even for the basepoint E chosen over Fp it is
rare for φA to be defined over Fp, and even then it is unclear that φA is necessarily induced
by an quadratic ideal a. Regardless, as a precaution, the De Feo-Plut-Jao scheme can
simply require one to choose a basepoint curve outside of Fp. In this case, the bottleneck
of the random walk makes the overall algorithm run in exponential time O˜(p1/4).
The best algorithm, so far, for the CSSI and DSSI problems, is a meet in the middle attack
that takes into account the specific parameters of the schemes. Two trees from E and EA
consisting of all lA paths from E and EA of length (degree)
eA
2
. Since leAA ∼
√
p, these trees
have depth ∼ p1/4). The problems is then to look for a collision in the set of final images
(or, for DSSI, to possibly declare that none exists). This problem can be framed as the
claw problem in complexity theory.
Proposition 5.4.8 ([12]). Framed as the claw problem, the meet in the middle attack
runs in time and space O(p1/4). By using an improvement for the quantum black box claw
problem, the quantum analogue of this attack runs in O(p1/6).
55
Chapter 6
Future Work
In our opinion, it is worthwhile to continue considering the general supersingular isogeny
problem and to obtain structural results for the supersingular isogeny graph — even if the
algorithms derived do not threaten a particular scheme directly, they may lead to others
that do, and otherwise serve to establish general considerations for constructing isogeny-
based cryptography using supersingular curves. The approach of Delfs and Galbraith
represents an effort to identify structure that is more ‘native’ to the ordinary case within
the supersingular graph. Identifying torsor structures within the supersingular graph, in
particular, was shown to be exploitable for significant classical and quantum algorithms
for supersingular isogeny problems.
A distinct approach is to better understand and utilize the characterization of the full
supersingular isogeny graph with regards to the curves’ full endomorphism rings in quater-
nion algebras, that Kohel established in his thesis [21, Chapter 5]. For supersingular curves
it is also true that the (e.g. left) ideals of the endomorphism ring of a curve dictates the
picture of outgoing isogenies from a curve. However, from this fact alone we cannot simply
derive a group action characterization of isogenies as in the ordinary case, because the
left ideal classes of the endomorphism ring do not even form a group. Still, speculatively
speaking, understanding and expanding the intricate mathematics in this domain may lead
to novel algorithms for the supersingular isogeny problem that more directly contend with
the idiosyncrasies of supersingularity.
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